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In recent years there has been a good deal of debate about the role of rote, repetitive 
rehearsal (called Type I or maintenance rehearsal) on the establishment of memory traces 
that outlast the rehearsal process itself. One advance in the technology used to study this 
problem is the operational definition of maintenance rehearsal proposed by Glenberg and 
Adams (1978, Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 17, 455-463). These au- 
thors argued that maintenance rehearsal should be defined as the continuous maintenance 
of information in memory using minimal cognitive capacity. Here this definition was adopted 
and extended in a paradigm in which the mental resources devoted to maintenance rehearsal 
could be systematically varied. The experiment revealed that there is, indeed, an effect of 
maintenance rehearsal on long-term recognition performance and that this effect depends 
on the mental resources devoted to the rehearsal process. 
The functions of rehearsal are two in 
number: to maintain information in a tem- 
porarily active state during short-term tasks 
and to create memory traces with some per- 
manence. The latter of these functions has 
often been attributed to the class of pro- 
cesses called "elaborative" rehearsal, pro- 
cesses such as chunking, forming images, 
or recoding material in various ways. How- 
ever, various sources of evidence have 
been accumulating to suggest that mainte- 
nance rehearsal--mainly rote repetition-- 
may also play some role in creating longer 
term memories. If this finding is correct, it 
is significant for two reasons. From a prac- 
tical point of view, rote repetition is the 
strategy that is probably used most fre- 
quently as a mnemonic, so it is important 
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to assess its efficacy in establishing 
memory traces with some permanence.  
From a theoretical point of view, the two 
most popular overall theories of memory 
differ in their claims about the role of rep- 
etition. The theory originally articulated by 
Atkinson and Shiffrin (1968) posits that 
maintenance rehearsal causes information 
to be transferred from short- to long-term 
memory. By contrast,  according to the 
levels-of-processing view (Craik & Lock- 
hart, 1972), maintenance rehearsal serves 
only to hold a particular level of code intact 
without creating a deeper level of code 
which, by the hypothesis, would result in a 
longer lasting trace. 
The significance of this issue has resulted 
in a body of research on the long-term ef- 
fects of maintenance rehearsal. In general, 
the results have been mixed. Some have 
found no connection between free recall 
and the amount of maintenance rehearsal 
(Craik & Watkins, 1973; Gotz & Jacoby, 
1974; Jacoby & Bartz, 1972; Meunier, Ritz, 
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& Meunier, 1972; Modigliani & Seamon, 
1974; Roenker, 1974; Rundus, 1977), while 
others have shown a direct relationship 
(Dark & Loftus,  1976; Darley & Glass, 
1975; Maki & Schuller, 1980; Mechanic, 
1962; Modigliani, 1976). Still others have 
found effects of maintenance rehearsal only 
on later recognition performance, and not 
recall (Woodward, Bjork, & Jongeward, 
1973; Glenberg, Smith & Green, 1977). 
As Nelson (1977) has pointed out, one 
reason for the ambiguity in results from 
these studies has to do with the definition 
of the maintenance process. Several inves- 
tigators have defined maintenance re- 
hearsal by its lack of effect on later recall, 
a definition that makes it impossible to 
study later memory effects of the process 
(e.g., Glenberg, Smith, & Green, 1977). 
The solution to this problem is to adopt 
a definition of maintenance rehearsal that 
is independent of its effects on later 
memory tests. Such a definition was sug- 
gested by Glenberg and Adams (1978). 
They proposed to define it as a mnemonic 
process that "continuously maintains infor- 
mation in memory using the minimum 
amount of cognitive capacity necessary to 
maintain the information" (p. 456). To meet 
the condition of their definition, they de- 
veloped a technique in which subjects were 
tested on memory for the distractors in a 
Brown-Peterson task using an incidental 
learning paradigm. Each trial consisted of 
the presentation of some numbers for 
study, followed by overt rehearsal of a 
word or words that served as the distrac- 
tors for the number task. As in the typical 
Brown-Peterson task, subjects were re- 
quired to recall the numbers on each trial. 
This was the primary task. The number of 
rehearsals required for the distractors was 
varied systematically to provide different 
amounts of rehearsal for this material. At 
the end of a series of these short-term 
memory trials, an unexpected recognition 
test for the rehearsed distractor words was 
administered. The rationale for using this 
task was that recall for the numbers served 
as the primary task to which subjects di- 
rected attention. This made rehearsal of the 
words a task of secondary importance so 
that subjects would presumably devote 
minimal processing resources to its execu- 
tion. Consequently, the final recognition 
test could assess the permanence of 
memory traces that may have been created 
by the minimally demanding rehearsal ac- 
tivity of repeating the words (a prototypical 
maintenance rehearsal strategy). 
With the innovation of this new opera- 
tional definition, Glenberg and Adams 
(1978) contrasted three different hy- 
potheses about the effect of maintenance 
rehearsal on later recognition of the re- 
hearsed words: 
(1) the "tagging" hypothesis, according 
to which a relationship between rehearsal 
and recognition is attributed to the addition 
of frequency or context tags to the memory 
trace, 
(2) the "depth" hypothesis, which attrib- 
utes the improvement in recognition with 
additional rehearsals to the accumulation of 
semantic information about the memory 
trace, 
(3) the "acoustic" hypothesis, according 
to which rehearsal and recognition are re- 
lated because rehearsal causes acoustic in- 
formation about a trace to accumulate. 
Using a specially designed recognition 
test (described later under Method), they 
found that maintenance rehearsal does play 
a role in establishing long-term memory 
traces. Specifically, it appears to strengthen 
the acoustic-phonemic components of the 
rehearsed information. They concluded 
that their findings were in conflict with the 
original Type I-Type II rehearsal distinc- 
tion suggested by Craik and Lockhart  
(1972). 
Since these conclusions depend on the 
operational definition of Type I (mainte- 
nance) rehearsal, it is essential to examine 
its adequacy. Let us consider two key is- 
sues that are germane to this examination. 
Minimizing capacity. The crucial feature 
of the present operational definition of 
maintenance rehearsal is that the process 
must make use of only the minimum 
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amount of cognitive capacity necessary to 
maintain information temporarily. Glenberg 
and Adams tried to establish this by having 
rehearsal be an incidental task. But this 
may not have been sufficient. It is possible 
that the number recall task was not as dif- 
ficult as necessary to command control 
over most of the processing capacity avail- 
able. This may have happened, for ex- 
ample, if subjects developed chunking 
strategies that allowed them to reduce the 
four single-digit numbers to fewer than four 
chunks of information, making the numbers 
less difficult to retain even with interfer- 
ence. Judging from the data in their exper- 
iment, this seems a reasonable hypothesis. 
The average accuracy for numbers in their 
experiment was around 84% for 2, 6, and 
10 rehearsals, not very far from ceiling. 
Moreover, after only one rehearsal, perfor- 
mance was no higher than 85%, so further 
rehearsals must barely have changed recall 
performance at all. This pattern of results 
suggests that the numbers might have been 
secured in memory after 1 rehearsal, then 
subjects may have switched their attention 
to the word task, hence using more than the 
minimal capacity necessary for mere main- 
tenance. 
Measuring capacity. There is a general 
problem raised by the discussion of mini- 
mizing capacity: How can one measure 
whether subjects trade resources on each 
trial between the act of rehearsing and the 
primary task of retaining the numbers? 
Glenberg and Adams (1978) suggested 
that evidence of no change in number recall 
with additional rehearsals would be evi- 
dence for a constant allocation of capacity 
to rehearsal. But this is an unreasonably 
stiff criterion. Although the issue of the for- 
getting agent (decay or interference) in 
short-term memory (STM) is not yet set- 
tled, the assumption underlying this crite- 
rion is that no decay occurs over time, or 
that interference by the rehearsed words 
does not cause any decrement in primary 
task performance. But in a Brown-Pe-  
terson task, with backward counting as the 
interpolated activity, typical results show a 
decrement in recall over time, even though 
no increase in cognitive capacity devoted 
to the secondary task is assumed (see 
Rundus, 1980, for a related argument). So 
we should be skeptical of results showing 
no change in recall performance with ad- 
ditional rehearsals because most  reason- 
able theories of forgetting would predict a 
decrease. In fact, one might interpret no 
change in recall as indicating a decrease in 
cognitive capacity devoted to additional re- 
hearsals. Thus, one might argue that the 
reason for Glenberg and Adams' not finding 
support for the "depth hypothesis" was a 
decrease in cognitive capacity allocated to 
additional rehearsals. 
The conclusion to draw from this line of 
argument is that merely using recall perfor- 
mance as a diagnostic of resource alloca- 
tion is not particularly reasonable. There 
are two alternative methods that are supe- 
rior. 
On a macroscopic level, one could com- 
pute a correlation between primary task 
performance and later recognition of the re- 
hearsed words, across different lengths of 
the rehearsal period. A trade-off between 
resources devoted to the primary task and 
to rehearsal would be indicated by a nega- 
tive correlation. That is, as the number of 
rehearsals increased, if subjects traded re- 
sources between number memorization and 
rehearsal, a decline in number recall would 
be accompanied by an increase in word rec- 
ognition. If obtained, this correlation would 
complicate an interpretation of the relation- 
ship between number of rehearsals and 
later recognition. The chief problem with 
this sort of gross analysis, however, is that 
it is susceptible to the error known as Simp- 
son's paradox. Even with no overall nega- 
tive correlation present across trials, there 
might still be a trial-by-trial relationship be- 
tween recall and recognition scores (see 
Hintzman, 1980, for a complete discussion 
of this problem in the context of other is- 
sues in memory research). 
There is a more powerful variant of the 
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correlational logic that provides a micro- 
scopic diagnosis of the same trade-off  
problem by analyzing data on a trial-by-trial 
basis, minimizing the effect of Simpson's 
paradox. Suppose that subjects do trade re- 
sources between number memorization and 
rehearsal of the distractor words. Then a 
trial on which a subject concentrated 
heavily on retaining the numbers in 
memory should result in poor later recog- 
nition of the rehearsed words, and vice 
versa. This prediction can be readily tested 
by creating a contingency table that relates 
recall of the numbers on any given trial to 
probability of later recognition. A trade-off 
in a contingency table of this sort would be 
revealed by calculating an odds ratio be- 
tween recall and recognition. To see why 
this is so, examine the mock data displayed 
in Table 2. The two cells along the major 
diagonal in both the left and right halves of 
this table represent trials on which subjects 
were correct on either recall or recognition 
tests, but not on both. The values in these 
cells ought to be large if subjects were 
trading resources between number reten- 
tion (which presumably is related to 
number recall) and rehearsal (which, by the 
hypothesis, is related to distractor recog- 
nition). An odds ratio would reveal such a 
trade-off since it is simply the product of 
the minor diagonal divided by the product 
of the major diagonal. To the extent that 
this ratio is less than 1.0, it reveals a trade- 
off between tasks. If the ratio is 1.0, the 
cells are independent, and there is no trade- 
off indicated. 
The purpose of this sort of analysis is not 
only to discover whether subjects trade re- 
call accuracy for later recognition accuracy, 
but also to discover whether this trade-off 
can account for an increase in later recog- 
nition with increased rehearsals. To meet 
this second goal, one must partition the 
data of an experiment such as Glenberg and 
Adams' into separate contingency tables 
for each number of rehearsals required in 
the task. Then an assessment of the trade- 
off can be made for each table and, more 
importantly, one can examine any change 
in the trade-off as a function of the number 
of rehearsals. It is this last analysis that will 
reveal whether a trade-off has contami- 
nated the effect of number of rehearsals on 
later recognition. 
Let us examine two hypothetical exam- 
ples to concretize this argument. Consider 
first the example illustrated in Table 1. 
These hypothetical data could have been 
drawn from a Brown-Pete rson  task in 
which subjects were required to recall num- 
bers on each trial after they had rehearsed 
distractor words for one of two rehearsal 
intervals, X or X + Y. In this experiment, 
furthermore,  after all trials were com- 
pleted, subjects were given a surprise rec- 
ognition test of the rehearsed words. The 
table displays hypothetical recall and rec- 
ognition performance as a function of re- 
hearsal interval. On the face of it, one might 
argue that the increase in recognition per- 
formance from 40 to 50% with increased 
number of rehearsals is simply a function 
of a trade-off with the decline in recall from 
80 to 60%. 
But the contingency data in Table 2 sug- 
gest that this is not the case. The table pre- 
sents contingency data on the relationship 
between recall and recognition for each 
number of rehearsals. As you can see, cal- 
culation of the odds ratios for each number 
of rehearsals suggests that recall and re- 
hearsal do not trade-off with one another 
(odds ratio = 1.0 for each). From this, it is 
extremely cumbersome and implausible to 
argue that while there is no trade-off for 
T A B L E  1 
A HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF MEAN PERCENTAGES 
OF CORRECT RECALL AND RECOGNITION RESPONSES 
FOR TWO DIFFERENT NUMBER OF REHEARSALS 
Rehearsa l  interval 
Measure  X X + Y 
Recall  
per formance  80 60 
Recognit ion 
per formance  40 50 
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T AB L E  2 
A HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF AN ASSOCIATION BETWEEN RECALL AND RECOGNITION PERFORMANCE FOR 
DIFFERENT NUMBERS OF REHEARSALS 
Rehearsal  interval 
X X +  Y 
Not Not  
Recognized  recognized Total Recognized recognized Total 
Recalled 32 48 80 30 30 60 
Not  recalled 8 12 20 20 20 40 
Total 40 60 100 50 50 100 
Odds ratio 1.00 1.00 
each interval alone, there is nevertheless a 
trade-off across intervals. Rather, we take 
such a result to indicate that the increase 
in recognition performance across intervals 
is not simply a function of the drop in re- 
call. 
Now consider a second example illus- 
trated in Table 3. Here we see an increase 
in recognition accuracy across rehearsal in- 
terval (40% to 50%) with no change in recall 
(80% vs 80%). One might be tempted in this 
case to argue that the change in recognition 
performance can be at tr ibuted only to a 
change in number of rehearsals, and not to 
any difference in recall performance. 
Further analysis suggests that this argu- 
ment would be premature, however. Table 
4 displays a hypothetical contingency tab- 
ulation of the data in Table 3. For the first 
number of rehearsals, X, we see that sub- 
jects appear to perform as if the recall and 
recognition tasks are independent of one 
another. But for trials with X + Y re- 
T A B L E  3 
A SECOND HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF MEAN 
PERCENTAGE OF CORRECT RECALL AND RECOGNITION 
RESPONSES FOR Two DIFFERENT 
NUMBER OF REHEARSALS 
Rehearsa l  interval 
Measure  X X + Y 
Recall 
per formance  80 80 
Recogni t ion 
per formance  40 50 
hearsals, there is a definite trade-off be- 
tween recall and recognition: Subjects 
show an increase in recognition at the ex- 
pense of their recall scores.  Thus, one 
might argue from these data that the in- 
crease in overall recognition from 40 to 50% 
is to some extent attributable to a change 
in subjects '  t rade-off  posture  with in- 
creased rehearsals.  Consequently,  one 
should be cautious in this case about 
drawing conclusions about a direct relation- 
ship between rehearsals and recognition. 
These examples can be summarized as 
follows: The first case shows that a change 
in recall performance is not sufficient to 
infer a change in allocation policy of cog- 
nitive resources  across number of re- 
hearsals. The second case shows that it is 
also not necessary. Instead, we advocate a 
more microscopic analysis of the trial-by- 
trial data themselves, an analysis that can 
be accomplished through the use of contin- 
gency tables that include recall and recog- 
nition scores. ~ This analysis minimizes 
problems due to Simpson's paradox by sep- 
arately evaluating a potential trade-off for 
each subject and each condition. 
Turning to our empirical work, the major 
purpose of the present experiment was to 
Note one limitation of this analysis.  Wheneve r  the 
values on one of  the  variables (recall or recognition) 
are close to the floor or  ceiling of  performance,  there 
will be a small number  of  observat ions  in one or more  
cells of  the corresponding cont ingency table. This will 
render  the representa t iveness  of  the odds ratio sus-  
pect. 
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TABLE 4 
A SECOND HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF AN ASSOCIATION BETWEEN RECALL AND RECOGNITION PERFORMANCE 
FOR DIFFERENT NUMBERS OF REHEARSALS 
Rehearsal interval 
X X +  Y 
Not Not 
Recognized recognized Total Recognized recognized Total 
Recalled 32 48 80 32 48 80 
Not recalled 8 12 20 18 2 20 
Total 40 60 100 50 50 100 
Odds ratio 1.00 0.07 
refine the technology developed by Glen- 
berg and Adams (1978) to study mainte- 
nance rehearsal. The procedural innovation 
that we introduced was a variation in the 
cognitive load demanded by the primary 
task. This was accomplished by varying the 
number of 2-digit numbers that subjects 
were required to retain (two, three, or four) 
on each of the Brown-Peterson trials. The 
effect of this variation was presumably to 
cause a concomitant variation in the ca- 
pacity available for rehearsing the dis- 
tractor words. This procedural refinement 
permitted us to conduct three tests con- 
cerning the effect of maintenance rehearsal: 
(a) We were able to attempt a replication 
of the results of Glenberg and Adams since 
the lightest level of memory load of the pri- 
mary task (two 2-digit numbers on each 
trial) was quite similar to their conditions. 
(b) We were able to provide a contin- 
gency analysis of recall and recognition 
across primary task loads and number of 
rehearsals. Even more importantly, the task 
allowed a rigorous test of the possibility 
that changes in recognition with increasing 
rehearsals are due to a changing trade-off 
of resource allocation between retention of 
the numbers and rehearsal. 
(c) By varying the demand of the primary 
task, it became possible to test whether 
minimal capacity was available for re- 
hearsal. This is crucial since the noncir- 
cular definition of maintenance rehearsal 
introduced by Glenberg and Adams (1978) 
uses minimal capacity as the hallmark. 
What results should one expect for the 
effect of number of rehearsals on later in- 
cidental recognition if primary task load is 
varied? Several predictions are available 
from current theories: First of all, a direct 
reading of the levels-of-processing ap- 
proach predicts that maintenance rehearsal 
will have no effect in laying down memory 
traces of the rehearsed words for later rec- 
ognition, regardless of primary task load. 
By contrast, the approach to memory orig- 
inally articulated by Atkinson and Shiffrin 
(1968) predicts a positive effect of re- 
hearsals on later recognition. But in this 
case, as more capacity is drawn away from 
the rehearsal process by increasing primary 
task load, the effect of rehearsals on rec- 
ognition should diminish. 
Finally, we might ask about the mecha- 
nism underlying an effect of rehearsals on 
recognition. TWo possibilities suggest them- 
selves. One is that increased maintenance 
rehearsal may simply increase the strength 
of a trace without affecting the nature of the 
code in which the trace is stored. Ac- 
cording to this hypothesis, an increase in 
capacity devoted to rehearsal will simply 
increase later recognition performance. A 
second possibility is that maintenance re- 
hearsal causes memory traces to change in 
code to a different and more permanent  
form much as elaborative rehearsal is as- 
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sumed to cause (e.g., acoustic to semantic). 
This hypothesis  then predicts  that in- 
creased capacity devoted to rehearsal will 
result not only in increased recognition, but 
also in evidence that the nature of the 
stored memory trace has changed. Our ex- 
periment was designed to discriminate be- 
tween these alternatives. 
METHOD 
Subjects. The subjects were 45 under- 
graduate students, male and female, at Ben- 
Gurion University of the Negev. They were 
paid $2.00 for their participation in a 75- 
minute session. 
Design. The basic task was modeled after 
the Brown-Peterson procedure. Subjects 
were first presented with two, three, or four 
2-digit numbers to hold in memory. Then 
they rehearsed a pak of words for a period 
of time that varied across trials (The partic- 
ular words used on each trial differed, and 
the words were counterbalanced across 
subjects for the number of times each was 
rehearsed). Finally, subjects were required 
to write down the numbers that they had 
memorized on each trial. At the end of the 
experiment, they were given an unexpected 
test of their recognition for the words. 
The difficulty of the primary task load 
(two, three, or four 2-digit numbers) was 
manipulated across subjects, with 15 sub- 
jects assigned to each task load. 
Altogether, there were 86 trials in the ex- 
periment. Of these, the first 6 were prac- 
tice. The next 4 trials and the last 4 were 
included to absorb primacy and recency ef- 
fects on the later recognition test (for a sim- 
ilar procedure  see Glenberg & Adams, 
1978; Glenberg, Green, & Smith, 1977; and 
Rundus, 1980). Data from the remaining 72 
trials were included in the analyses pre- 
sented below. 
The 72 test trials were composed of 24 
for which subjects engaged in 1 rehearsal, 
24 for which 5 rehearsals were required, 
and 24 for which 10 rehearsals  were re- 
quired. The number of rehearsals required 
on any trial was not predictable. 
Apparatus and materials. All stimuli 
were presented visually via an externally 
timed Kodak Carousel slide projector, con- 
trolled by one channel of a stereo tape 
deck. 
The numbers used for the primary task 
on each of the 86 trials consisted of two, 
three, or four 2-digit numbers. These sets 
of numbers were selected randomly with 
the following constraints: (a) All numbers 
were drawn from the numbers 12 to 98 in- 
clusive. (b) No numbers whose two digits 
were identical (e.g., 55) were included. (c) 
No two numbers in a set were integer mul- 
tiples of one another. 
The pair of words used for rehearsal on 
each trial consisted of one- or two-syllable 
common Hebrew words. There were no ob- 
vious semantic or acoustic relationships be- 
tween the words in each pair. 
The final recognition test was a five-al- 
ternative forced-choice task similar to the 
one used by Glenberg and Adams (1978). 
The recognition task was designed to assess 
the form of the code in which rehearsed 
items might be stored. For each of the 72 
experimental trials, one word of each pair 
was chosen as the target word (T) on the 
recognition test (on half of the trials the top 
word, and on half, the bottom word on a 
slide). For each of the recognition trials, a 
set of four one- or two-syllable common 
Hebrew words was generated as a dis- 
tractor set. One distractor for each trial was 
a synonym (S) or was closely related in 
meaning to the target. Another distractor 
(A) was acoustically related to the target (a 
rhyme). Two other distractors, CS and CA, 
served as controls for the semantic and 
acoustic properties of the target, and were 
generated according to the following 
scheme used by Coltheart (1977): On one 
third of the recognition trials, CS was se- 
mantically similar to A, and CA was 
acoustically similar to S; on one third of the 
trials, CS was semantically similar to A, 
and CA was acoustically similar to CS; and 
on the final one third, CS was semantically 
similar to CA, and CA was acoustically 
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similar to S. 2 These relations were used to 
control for any systematic individual bias 
that subjects might develop in their re- 
sponses to distractors. The procedure es- 
sentially removes the possibility of sub- 
jects '  eliminating distractors based on their 
acoustic or semantic similarity to each 
other or to the target. These trials were ran- 
domly intermixed. 
On the recognition test, the five words 
(T, S, A, CS, CA) on each trial were ran- 
domly arranged under the constraint that 
each type of word appear equally often in 
each of the five serial positions. The 72 rec- 
ognition trials were arranged on three 
sheets of paper, each sheet containing 24 
sets. Within the 24 sets on each page there 
were 8 that contained a target word for each 
of the three numbers of  rehearsals .  The 
order in which the target words appeared 
in the recognition test was randomized with 
respect to their order of appearance on the 
study trials. 
Procedure. Subjects were told that the 
experiment involved a test of short-term 
memory for numbers. Each trial began with 
a ready signal given by the experimenter. 
After 2 seconds,  a slide displaying two, 
three, or four 2-digit numbers appeared for 
2 seconds of silent study. It was replaced 
by a slide presenting a pair of words one 
next to the other, for 1 second (a short du- 
ration was used to prevent covert rehearsal 
while the words were on the screen). This 
was followed by a blank slide. The blank 
slide remained for an interval of 2.7, 8.0, or 
13.3 seconds, allowing 1, 5, or 10 overt re- 
hearsals for each pair of words. During the 
interval, a 75-millisecond, 1000-Hz tone re- 
corded on one track of a tape was sounded 
at a rate of once every 1.33 seconds. Sub- 
2 The CS and CA notation should not confuse the 
reader. It does not refer to the relationship that CS has 
with S and CA with A. Rather it refers to the fact that 
CS is semantically related to the items for which it is 
a control, and CA is likewise acoustically related to 
the items for which it is a control. We have used this 
somewhat confusing notation for no reason other than 
precedence. 
TABLE 5 
MEAN PERCENTAGE OF CORRECT RESPONSES (WITH 
SD IN PARENTHESES) FOR NUMBER RECALL AS A 
FUNCTION OF NUMBER OF REHEARSALS AND 
PRIMARY TASK LOAD 
Primary Number of rehearsals 
task 
load 1 5 10 
2 85.2 (15.6) 80.7 (14.3) 78.3 (15.8) 
3 45.7 (15.4) 35.1 (16.9) 32.4 (18.1) 
4 31.4 (14.1) 25.8 (12.9) 22.6 (16.6) 
jects  were instructed to overt ly cycle 
through both words of each pair in time 
with the tones, once for each tone sounded. 
On each trial, after the last tone sounded 
and the last rehearsal was complete, sub- 
jects were given 10 seconds to write the 
numbers down in their order of appearance. 
After complet ion of all 86 trials, each 
subject was engaged in conversation for 
about 2 minutes. Then each subject was un- 
expectedly given a self-paced recognition 
test for the words. Subjects were not per- 
mitted to change a response to a trial on the 
recognition test once it was completed. 
Following the recognition test, subjects 
were debriefed and asked whether or not 
they had anticipated the recognition test. 
None had. 
Subjects were run in groups of three to 
seven. To avoid interference from overt re- 
hearsals, subjects were seated in individual 
booths so that they could not see each 
other. In addition, each subject wore ear- 
phones that blocked most external noise. 
RESULTS 
Number recall. Table 5 presents the per- 
centage of numbers recalled as a function 
of primary task load and number of re- 
hearsals. In scoring these data, a strict cri- 
terion was used in which a response was 
scored as correct only if all digits were re- 
called in their correct serial order. 
The data in Table 5 show two trends that 
were confirmed by an analysis of variance. 
First, recall performance declines as pri- 
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mary task load increases, F(2,42) = 6.77, 
p < .01. Second, recall performance drops 
with increasing number of rehearsals, 
F(2,84) = 4.21, p < .05. Both of these ef- 
fects are to be expected in a task of this 
sort. As primary task load increases, there 
is an increasing capacity load on the 
memory system, and previous research has 
shown that this causes a decrease in overall 
performance (Murdock, 1961). Also, the 
standard effect of a distractor activity on 
number recall is that there is interference 
with the retained items as a direct function 
of the amount of distractor activity (Pe- 
terson & Peterson, 1959). 
Word recognition. Table 6 presents ac- 
curacy data for the surprise recognition 
test. A two-way analysis of variance of 
these data revealed a reliable effect of pri- 
mary task load, F(2,42) -= 3.97, p < .05, no 
significant effect of number of rehearsals, 
F(2,84) = 1.96, p > .05, and a statistically 
significant interaction of these variables, 
F(4,84) = 4.13, p < .01. To further analyze 
the interaction, we performed separate one- 
way ANOVAs for each primary task load. 
Only that for a task load of 2 showed a re- 
liable effect, F(2,28) = 3.77, p < .05. Post 
hoc analysis of this effect revealed that the 
difference between 1 and 5 rehearsals is re- 
liable, (t(14) = 3.11, p < .05), but the dif- 
ference between 5 and 10 is not, (t(14) = 
0.63, p > .05). 
Errors in recognition. The design of the 
experiment permitted an examination of 
whether subjects tended to make errors on 
the recognition test by choosing items that 
TABLE 6 
MEAN PERCENTAGE CORRECT (WITH SD IN 
PARENTHESES) FOR THE UNEXPECTED RECOGNITION 
TEST AS A FUNCTION OF PRIMARY TASK LOAD AND 
NUMBER OF REHEARSALS 
Primary Number  of  reliearsals 
task 
load 1 5 10 
2 33.6 (14.4) 43.1 (16.3) 46.7 (20.7) 
3 28.1 (12.6) 33.8 (17.1) 35.8 (16.8) 
4 32.5 (12.9) 31.2 (19.1) 27.9 (16.6) 
were acoustically or semantically related to 
the target item. Recall that for each five- 
alternative recognition item, one of the al- 
ternatives (A) was acoustically similar to 
the target, and that one (CA) was a corre- 
sponding control for the acoustically sim- 
ilar alternative (refer to the method section 
for defining characteristics of the control 
items). Thus, the ratio A:CA calculated 
over items for a subject is an index of 
whether each subject chooses an acousti- 
cally similar alternative more than expected 
by chance when an error is made. Also re- 
call that one of the remaining two alterna- 
tives for each recognition item was seman- 
tically similar to the target (S), and that the 
other was a control for semantic similarity 
(CS). Thus, the ratio S:CS represents a 
measure of semantic errors committed by 
each subject. 
Averaging these ratios across subjects re- 
quired first converting each ratio to a log 
ratio for each subject for each primary task 
load and for each number of rehearsals. 
These log ratios were then averaged across 
subjects, then transformed back to ratios. 
This method of averaging is necessary be- 
cause averaging the ratios themselves will 
lead to a bias. For example, if one subject 
had a ratio of 2:1 and if this were averaged 
with another subject whose ratio was 1:2, 
the result would be 1.25:1. Since a ratio 
larger than 1.0 leads one to suspect that 
subjects are making acoustic or semantic 
errors (depending on which ratio is being 
computed), this is not a particularly con- 
servative procedure (but see Glenberg & 
Adams, 1978, for a case where it was used 
nevertheless). Averaging log ratios is more 
conservative. 
Table 7 presents these averaged ratios for 
each primary task load and each number of 
rehearsals. Two-way analyses of variance 
were computed for the A:CA and the S:CS 
measures separately. There were no reli- 
able effects in the analysis of the S:CS 
ratio. By contrast, for the A:CA ratio, all 
effects were statistically significant: pri- 
mary task load, F(2,42) -- 3.35, p < .05; 
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TABLE 7 
MEAN RATIOS OF ACOUSTIC AND SEMANTIC CHOICES 
(WITH SD IN PARENTHESES) ON THE RECOGNITION 
TEST AS A FUNCTION OF PRIMARY TASK LOAD AND 




Number of rehearsals 
1 5 10 
A:CA 
2 0.98 (1.38) 1.17 (1.29) 1.27 (1.56) 
3 1.10 (1.11) 1.56 (1.53) 2.00 (1.22) 
4 1.03 (1.28) 1.70 (0.99) 1.68 (1.09) 
TABLE 8 
MEAN ODDS RATIOS OF RECALL VS RECOGNITION 
MEASURES AS A FUNCTION OF NUMBER OF 




Number  of rehearsals 
1 5 10 
2 1.09 0.98 0.93 
3 1.10 1.34 0.80 
4 1.18 1.06 0.70 
S:CS 
2 1.12 (1.49) 1.40 (1.17) 1.30 (1.39) 
3 1.40 (1.13) 1.34 (1.60) 1.48 (1.58) 
4 0.99 (1.50) 0.90 (1.24) 1.23 (1.41) 
Note. See the text for details about the items themselves, 
and for the averaging procedure. 
number of rehearsals, F(2,82) = 3.71, p < 
.05; interaction, F(4,84) = 2.88, p < .05. 
For the A:CA measure,  separate one-way 
ANOVAs for each task load revealed reli- 
able effects of  number  of  rehearsals for task 
loads 3, F(2,28) = 3.67, p < .05, and 4, 
F(2,28) = 3.67, p < .05, but  not  for  2, 
F(2,28) = 1.74, p > .05. 
Contingency tabulation and odds ratio 
analysis. As described above, analysis of  
the recognition scores revealed a reliable 
effect of  number  of  rehearsals for a primary 
task load of 2, and no reliable effects for 
task loads of  3 and 4. Fur thermore  the ef- 
fect for task load 2 was confined largely to 
the difference between 1 and 5 rehearsals. 
To assess whether  this effect could be at- 
tributed to subjects trading resources be- 
tween  m e m o r y  for  the number s  and re- 
hearsal of  the words,  an analysis was con- 
ducted on the recognit ion and recall scores 
for the three task loads. This analysis in- 
volved calculation of  an odds ratio (as de- 
scribed above) for  each subject, for each 
task load, and for each rehearsal  interval. 
Log  odds  ra t ios  were  used  to ave rage  
across subjects. For  cases in which any of  
the cells included a value of  0, .5 was used 
to replace this value (this is a standard pro- 
cedure;  see Anscombe,  1956; Gart,  1966; 
Gart  & Zweifel, 1967). 
The values  f rom this ca lcula t ion trans- 
formed back to odds ratios are shown in 
Table 8. If  the reliable increase in recogni- 
t ion p e r f o r m a n c e  b e t w e e n  1 and 5 re- 
hearsa ls  for  task load 2 were  due to in- 
c reased  t rade-of f  be tween  resources  ap- 
plied to number  re ten t ion  and resources  
applied to rehearsal ,  then  the odds ratio 
should show a reliable decrease from 1 to 
5. It does not. Nor  are the ratios for 1 or 5 
rehearsals less than 1.0. 
By contrast,  there is a decline in odds 
ratio between 5 and 10 rehearsals for all 
three primary task loads, as Table 8 illus- 
trates, F(1,56) = 4.43, p < .05, and the 
value for I0 rehearsals is less than 1.0, t(44) 
= 2.41, p < .05. One may therefore con- 
clude that as the rehearsal period lengthens 
past 5 rehearsals, subjects begin to allocate 
their processing resources to the act of  ei- 
ther rehearsal or retaining the numbers in 
memory. This trade-off  makes it difficult to 
interpret the lack of  increase in recognition 
scores from 5 to 10 rehearsals. If  subjects, 
for example,  are trying to stem erosion of 
the memory  traces for the numbers by con- 
centra t ing on retaining the numbers ,  the 
trade-off  indicates that the resources to do 
this are being b o r r o w e d  f rom rehearsa l .  
This, in turn, could lead to lower recogni- 
tion scores later. This strategy, or others 
consistent with an increased trade-off  be- 
tween 5 and 10 rehearsals,  renders the rec- 
ogni t ion  compar i sons  b e t w e e n  these  re- 
hearsal conditions ambiguous. The trade- 
o f f  for  10 rehearsa l s  does ,  howeve r ,  
conf i rm the a s sumpt ion  i n t ro d u ced  by  
Glenberg and Adams (1978) that subjects 
can share resources between rehearsal and 
r e t en t i o n  of  the p r imary  task mater ia l .  
Thus, it is appropriate to assume that dual- 
task methodology can be used to vary re- 
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sources applied to the two relevant pro- 
cesses. In particular, we can now feel con- 
fident that a demanding primary task load 
will minimize resources that are allocated 
to rehearsal. 
The odds ratio analysis has revealed two 
aspects of performance in this task. First, 
by virtue of the significant drop of the ratio 
below 1.0 for 10 rehearsals, we can be con- 
fident that subjects can trade resources be- 
tween these tasks and that the odds ratio is 
sensitive to this strategy. Second, by virtue 
of the lack of reliable change in ratio be- 
tween 1 and 5 rehearsals, and by virtue of 
the fact that these ratios do not differ from 
1.0, we can conclude that the change in rec- 
ognition scores from 1 to 5 rehearsals for 
task load 2 and the invariance of these 
scores for task loads 3 and 4 are not due to 
subjects' trading resources between main- 
taining the numbers in memory  and re- 
hearsing. 3 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the present experiment 
was to assess whether  maintenance re- 
hearsal plays any role in laying down 
memory traces that outlast the duration of 
the rehearsal process itself. To meet this 
goal, we refined an experimental Pr0cedure 
devised by Glenberg and Adams (1978) in 
which maintenance rehearsal was defined 
by its minimal demand on some central  
pool of cognitive resources. Let us review 
the results of our exper iment  and draw 
some conclusions about the effect of re- 
hearsal on long-term memory traces, and 
3 Given the complexity of the task and of the anal- 
yses, a separate experiment was conducted to repli- 
cate our findings. The experiment was substantially 
similar to the present one. This experiment resulted in 
an effect of task load on recognition scores. Further- 
more, the interaction of task load and number of re- 
hearsals showed again, as in the present experiment, 
that most of the recognition effect was for small num- 
bers of rehearsals with a task load of 2. Finally, these 
results could not be explained by a trade-off hypoth- 
esis, as revealed by an analysis Of odds ratios. Our 
success in replication increases our confidence in the 
major results of the present experiment. 
let us examine some methodological impli- 
cations of our procedure. 
To begin, maintenance rehearsal  does 
seem to play a role in laying down long- 
term memory traces. This is indicated by 
three results. First, for a conctirrent pri- 
mary task load of 2, recognit ion perfor- 
mance increased as subjects increased their 
rehearsals of the distractor words. Now 
one might argue, as we did above, that this 
result is not completely convincing since a 
concurrent  task load of 2 may not suffi- 
ciently tax the supply of processing re- 
sources to ensure that minimum capacity is 
devoted to rehearsal (as the current oper- 
ational definition of maintenance rehearsal 
demands). The response to this argument is 
that there are effects of maintenance re- 
hearsal on later recognition with the more 
demanding concurrent task loads of 3 and 
4 as well. But these effects are not in- 
creases in accuracy. Rather, subjects make 
nonrandom patterns of errors in their re- 
sponses,  pat terns that indicate residual 
memory traces of the rehearsed material. 
For task loads of 3 and 4 the errors were 
acoustically related to the target. Thus, 
even though overall recognition accuracy 
does not increase with more demanding 
concurrent tasks, there is reason to believe, 
nonetheless ,  that the rehearsal  process ,  
which with heavier task loads more closely 
satisfies the minimal capacity definition of 
"maintenance" rehearsal, is causing more 
permanent traces to be established. 
How do we reconcile these results with 
the currently popular views of memory? 
The data contradict the most direct reading 
of the levels-of-processing view since one 
of its central assumptions is that mainte- 
nance rehearsal keeps a single level of code 
intact, and does not create the deeper level 
codes necessary for longer term retention. 
But suppose this assumption were relaxed, 
and maintenance rehearsal were assumed 
to provide an opportunity for deeper level 
codes to be created, much as the levels-of- 
processing view assumes for elaborative re- 
hearsal. 'And further suppose that the ex- 
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tent to which these deeper level codes are 
created is a function of the effort or ca- 
pacity devoted to the maintenance process. 
This confluence of suppositions provides 
an interesting opportunity to propose a 
mechanism that would account for the pat- 
tern of errors with changing primary task 
loads. With little draw on capacity (in the 
condition where load = 2), as the rehearsal 
process continues, traces are established 
with sufficient strength and depth to serve 
as the foundation for accurate later recog- 
nition. As some of the capacity for re- 
hearsal is withdrawn (with loads of 3 or 4), 
the traces are still encoded to an acoustic 
level, but not sufficiently well to serve as 
the basis of accurate recognition, only well 
enough to cause acoustic confusion errors. 
Note that the data suggest that changes 
in recognition performance (whether accu- 
racy or patterns of errors) are restricted 
largely to the interval from 2 to 6 rehearsals 
(data of Geiselman & Bjork, 1980, support 
this result, although recall data by Rundus, 
1980, contradict it). This may suggest that 
it is only these first few rehearsals that are 
consequential for the establishment of more 
permanent memories. Perhaps subjects use 
the first few rehearsals to somehow inte- 
grate the rehearsed words into a unitary 
trace, a process that may increase the dis- 
tinctiveness of the words and enhance later 
recognition (Mandler, 1979). An integration 
process would result not only in better later 
recognition, but also, as Mandler has sug- 
gested, in a more automated rehearsal pro- 
cess which would free up capacity for 
number retention in our task. This would 
be consistent with the trade-off between re- 
hearsal and number retention that we ob- 
tained with 10 rehearsals. 
While this model of maintenance re- 
hearsal and its effects on memory is some- 
what speculative, it is consistent with the 
available data, and it raises the interesting 
theoretical possibility that maintenance re- 
hearsal is actually composed of two sub- 
processes. The first creates traces of the 
rehearsed items by some operation, such as 
integration, that has an effect on later re- 
tention. The second takes these traces and 
recirculates them on a temporary basis to 
refresh the current contents of memory. 
This second, more automatic process may 
have little effect by itself on later retention 
of the rehearsed material. Taken together, 
these two processes may form a better view 
of maintenance rehearsal than the single 
process account that has been assumed in 
previous research. We have obtained sup- 
port for such a two process model in recent 
work in our laboratory (Naveh-Benjamin & 
Jonides, 1984). 
Our appraisal of the role of rehearsal on 
later recognition has hinged crucially on ex- 
panding the definition of maintenance re- 
hearsal proposed by Glenberg and Adams 
(1978). They rested their definition on the 
criterion of capacity devoted to rehearsal, 
claiming that maintenance rehearsal should 
be identified with a minimal allocation of 
processing capacity. There are two impli- 
cations of this definition that should be 
made clear. 
First, to apply this definition carefully in 
an experimental context one must be sure 
that minimal capacity is devoted to re- 
hearsal. Currently, the best available tech- 
nology to apply to this problem is the dual- 
task methodology. But there is an important 
caveat to keep in mind: Effective applica- 
tion of the dual-task technique requires that 
both tasks draw from the same limited pool 
of processing resources. This can be tested 
by examining whether there exist any 
trade-offs in performance between the two 
tasks under any of the relevant experi- 
mental conditions. In the present experi- 
ment, for example, clear evidence of a 
trade-off was present when subjects were 
required to produce 10 rehearsals. But ev- 
idence for a trade-off is both good news and 
bad: While it satisfies an assumption of the 
dual-task methodology, it opens the possi- 
bility that differences in later recognition 
with increased rehearsals are merely a 
function of the trade-off itself. To rule out 
this alternative, one must be sure that in- 
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creased recognition scores are not corre- 
lated with increased trade-off between re- 
call and rehearsal. 
The second implication of  using a ca- 
pacity-based definition of maintenance re- 
hearsal concerns the relationship between 
maintenance and elaborative rehearsal. As 
Glenberg and Adams (1978) discuss, this 
definitional scheme opens the possibility of 
viewing maintenance and elaborative re- 
hearsal on a continuum from less to more 
capacity-demanding processes. Since ac- 
cumulating evidence now suggests that the 
two rehearsal processes may not be distin- 
guishable by their differential effects on 
long-term memory, and since there may be 
little else to distinguish them formally, the 
view that they differ from one another only 
quantitatively becomes more attractive. 
Perhaps this view will spawn lines of re- 
search that compare performance implica- 
tions of the two rehearsal strategies while 
at the same time varying the capacity avail- 
able for each. 
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